이번 보고서
2025.04 분기보고서
10-Q · 기간 말 2025. 4. 27. · 제출 2025. 5. 28.
비교 기준
2025 연차보고서 이후 누적
10-K · 기간 말 2025. 1. 26.
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AI 한국어 요약
이 보고서의 한국어 요약은 준비 중입니다. 아래 원문 비교를 먼저 확인하세요.
원문 비교
- We plan to increase our U.S.-based manufacturing and invest in specialized equipment and processes to support domestic production. Our ability to increase manufacturing capabilities will depend on the domestic manufacturing ecosystem's capacity to ramp production supply to the required volume timely. Delays or shortfalls could impact our ability to meet demand.
- On April 9, 2025, the USG informed us that it requires a license for export to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and D:5 countries, or to companies headquartered or with an ultimate parent therein, of our H20 integrated circuits and any other circuits achieving the H20’s memory bandwidth, interconnect bandwidth, or combination thereof. As a result of these new requirements, we incurred a $4.5 billion charge in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026 associated with H20 for excess inventory and purchase obligations, as the demand for H20 products diminished.
- The export controls applicable to China are complex and address a variety of parameters, including the total processing performance of a chip, the “performance density” of a chip, the interconnect bandwidth of a chip, and the memory bandwidth of a chip. We may be unable to create a competitive product for China’s data center market that receives approval from the USG. In that event, we would effectively be foreclosed from competing in China's data center computing/compute market, with a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.
- In May 2025, the USG announced that it would rescind the AI Diffusion IFR and implement a replacement rule. The scope, timing, and requirements of the forthcoming rule remain uncertain. The replacement rule may impose new restrictions on our products or operations and/or add license requirements that could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.
- Open-source foundation models are rapidly growing in popularity with developers worldwide. Any regulatory control or other restriction that limits our ability to provide products and services that support third-party applications and models, including applications built on foundation models originating in China such as DeepSeek or Qwen, could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.
- The increasingly complex export controls impose complex and burdensome compliance obligations on our partners, suppliers, and customers. While we seek to strictly comply with all applicable export control regulators, reports of diversion of controlled products may negatively impact our business, relationships with partners and customers, and our reputation. Incorrect allegations that our compliance efforts satisfy the letter but not the “spirit” of the applicable regulations may negatively impact our business, relationships with partners and customers, and our reputation.
- Long manufacturing lead times and uncertain supply and
componentcapacity availability, combined with a failure to estimate customer demand accurately, has led and could lead to mismatches between supply and demand. - Challenges in estimating demand could become more pronounced or volatile in the future on both a global and regional basis. Extended lead times may occur if we experience other supply constraints caused by natural disasters, pandemics or other events. In addition, geopolitical tensions, such as those involving Taiwan and China, which comprise a significant portion of our revenue and where we have suppliers, contract manufacturers, and assembly partners who are critical to our supply continuity, could have a material adverse impact on us. Publicly announced intentions by governments or other companies to purchase our products can further complicate our demand estimates, as such announcements are often non-binding and may not result in committed volumes.
- We are subject to laws and regulations domestically and worldwide, affecting our operations in areas including, but not limited to, IP ownership and infringement; taxes; import and export requirements and tariffs; anti-corruption, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; business acquisitions; foreign exchange controls and cash repatriation restrictions; foreign ownership and investment; data privacy requirements; competition and antitrust; advertising; employment; product regulations; cybersecurity; environmental, health, and safety requirements; the responsible use of AI; sustainability; cryptocurrency; and consumer laws. Compliance with such requirements can be onerous and expensive, could impact our competitive position, and may negatively impact our business operations and ability to manufacture and ship our products. There can be no assurance that our employees, contractors, suppliers, customers or agents will not violate applicable laws or the policies, controls, and procedures that we have designed to help ensure compliance with such laws, and violations could result in fines, criminal sanctions against us, our officers, or our employees, prohibitions on the conduct of our business, and damage to our reputation. Changes to the laws, rules and regulations to which we are subject, or changes to their interpretation and enforcement, could lead to materially greater compliance and other costs, and/or further restrictions on our ability to manufacture and supply our products and operate our business. For example, we may face increased compliance costs as a result of changes or increases in antitrust legislation, regulation, administrative rule making, increased focus from regulators on cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks. Our position in markets relating to AI has led to increased interest in our business from regulators worldwide, including the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, South
KoreaKorea, Japan, and China. For example, the French Competition Authority collected information from us regarding our business and competition in the graphics card andcloud service providerCSP market as part of an ongoing inquiry into competition in those markets. We have also received, and continue to receive, broad requests for information from competition regulators in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and South Korea regarding our sales of GPUs and other NVIDIA products, our efforts to allocate supply, foundation models and our investments, partnerships and other agreements with companies developing foundation models, the markets in which we compete and our competition, our strategies, roadmaps, and efforts to develop, market, and sell hardware, software, and system solutions, and our agreements with customers, suppliers, and partners. We expect to receive additional requests for information in the future. Such requestsmayhave been and are likely to be expensive and burdensome and could negatively impact our business and our relationships with customers, suppliers, and partners. - Such restrictions could include additional unilateral or multilateral export controls on certain products or technology, including but not limited to AI technologies. As geopolitical tensions have increased, semiconductors associated with AI, including GPUs and related products, are increasingly the focus of export control restrictions proposed by stakeholders in the U.S. and its allies. The United States has imposed unilateral worldwide controls restricting GPUs and associated products, and it is likely that additional unilateral or multilateral controls will be adopted. Such controls have been and may again be very broad in scope and application, prohibit us from exporting our products to any or all customers in one or more markets,
including but not limited to China and over 150 countries designated “Tier 2” by the January 2025 AI Diffusion IFR,and could negatively impact our manufacturing, testing and warehousing locations and options, or could impose other conditions that limit our ability to serve demand abroad and could negatively and materially impact our business, revenue and financial results. Export controls targeting GPUs and semiconductors associated with AI, which have been imposed and are increasingly likely to be further tightened, would further restrict our ability to export our technology, products, or services even though competitors may not be subject to similar restrictions, creating a competitive disadvantage for us and negatively impacting our business and financial results. Export controls targeting GPUs and semiconductors associated with AI have subjected and may in the future subject downstream users of our products to additional restrictions on the use, resale, repair, or transfer of our products, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Controls could negatively impact our cost and/or ability to provide services such as NVIDIA AI cloud services and could impact the cost and/or ability for our CSPs and customers to provide services to their end customers, even outside China. - Increasing use of economic sanctions and export controls has impacted and may in the future impact demand for our products or services, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Reduced demand due to export controls has and could
alsoin the future lead to excess inventory or cause us to incur related supply charges. Additional unilateral or multilateral controls are also likely to include deemed export control limitations that negatively impact the ability of our research and development teams to execute our roadmap or other objectives in a timely manner. Additional export restrictions may not only impact our ability to serve overseas markets, but also provoke responses from foreign governments, including China, that negatively impact our supply chain or our ability to provide our products and services to customers in all markets worldwide, which could also substantially reduce our revenue. Regulators in China have inquired about our sales and efforts to supply the China market and our fulfillment of the commitments we entered at the close of our Mellanox acquisition. For example, regulators in China are investigating whether complying with applicable U.S. export controls discriminates unfairly against customers in the China market. If regulators conclude that we have failed to fulfill such commitments or we have violated any applicable law in China, we could be subject to financial penalties, restrictions on our ability to conduct our business, restrictions or other orders regarding our networkingproductsbusiness, products, and services, or otherwise impact our operations in China, any of which could have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition. In October 2023,During the third quarter of fiscal year 2024, the USG announced new and updated licensing requirementsthat became effective in our fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024for exports to China and Country Groups D1, D4, and D5 (including but not limited to, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, but excluding Israel) of our products exceeding certain performance thresholds, including, but not limited to, the A100, A800, H100, H800, L4, L40, L40S RTX 4090, GB200 NVL72, andRTX 4090.B200. The licensing requirements also apply to the export of products exceeding certain performance thresholds to a party headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Country Group D5, including China.- In addition to controls targeting D:4 and D:5 countries, the USG has also imposed worldwide export controls impacting our products, and may impose additional controls in the future. On January 15, 2025, the USG published the “AI Diffusion” IFR in the Federal Register. After a 120-day delayed compliance period, the IFR
will, unless modified, imposewould have imposed a worldwide licensing requirement on all products classified under Export Control Classification Numbers, or ECCNs, 3A090.a, 4A090.a, or corresponding .z ECCNs, including all related software and technology. The licensing requirement would have applied to our most popular data center products, such as our H200 and GB200. The AI Diffusion IFR woulddividehave divided the world into three tiers, relegating most countries to “Tier 2”status.status, and would have created a complex and burdensome scheme for licensing approvals. - Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing
requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated “Tier 2” by the AI Diffusion IFR.requirements. - For example, the USG has already imposed conditions to limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, for example by imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. Such government mandates in chip designs could introduce system vulnerabilities and expose us to significant risk and potential liability, negatively impact demand for our products, and could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.
- Any new control that impacts a wider range of our products would likely have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control.
Excessive or shifting exportExport controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to “design-out” certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide.Excessive or shifting exportExport controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results. - As a result,
excessive or shiftingexport controls may negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. Excessive or shifting export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S.advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting itssale.sale, resulting in excess inventory and purchase obligations as we recently experienced with the H20. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls.- In addition to export controls, the USG may impose restrictions on the import and sale of products that incorporate technologies developed or manufactured in whole or in part in China. For example, the USG
is consideringadopted “Connected Vehicle” restrictions on the import and sale of certain automotive products in the United States, which if adopted and interpreted broadly, could impact our ability to develop and supply solutions for our automotive customers. The USG is also considering restrictions that would limit our ability to support third-party applications and models built on open-source foundation models originating in China. Such restrictions, if implemented, would favor our foreign competitors and negatively impact our business. - During the third quarter of fiscal year 2023, the USG announced export restrictions and export licensing requirements targeting China’s semiconductor and supercomputing industries. These restrictions
impactimpacted exports of certain chips, as well as software, hardware, equipment and technology used to develop, produce and manufacture certain chips to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and Russia, and specifically impact our A100 and H100 integrated circuits, DGX or any other systems or boards which incorporate A100 or H100 integrated circuits. During the second quarter of fiscal year 2024, the USG also informed us of an additional licensing requirement for a subset of A100 and H100 products destined to certain customers and other regions, including some countries in the Middle East. - Our competitive position has been harmed by
the existingexport controls, and our competitive position and future results may be further harmed, over the long term, if there are further changes in the USG’s export controls, including further expansion of the geographic, customer, or product scope of the controls, if customers purchase product from competitors, if customers develop their own internal solution, if we are unable to provide contractual warranty or other extended service obligations, if the USG does not grant licenses in a timely manner or denies licenses to significant customers or if we incur significant transition costs. Even if the USG grants any requested licenses, the licenses may be temporary or impose burdensome conditions that we or our customers or end users cannot or choose not to fulfill. The licensing requirements may benefit certain of our competitors, as the licensing process will make our pre-sale and post-sale technical support efforts more cumbersome and less certain and encourage customers in China to pursue alternatives to our products, including semiconductor suppliers based in China, Europe, and Israel.